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Abstract
This paper shows that the explanation of the decline in the volatility of GDP
growth since the mid-eighties is not the decline in the volatility of exogenous shocks
but rather a change in their propagation mechanism.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E37, C32, C53
Keywords: Shocks, Information, Great Moderation.5
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In the last twenty years the volatility of output growth and inﬂation in all OECD
economies has declined. This phenomenon is known as “the Great Moderation”. Is the
volatility decline to be attributed to exogenous causes, that is the decline in the volatil-
ity of shocks (“good luck” hypothesis) or to a change in the propagation mechanism of
the shocks (change in the structure – “good policy” hypothesis)? Concerning inﬂation,
the literature tends to attribute the decline in volatility to a credible monetary policy
to a nominal anchor (see e.g. Stock and Watson 2002, 2003; Ahmed, Levin and Wilson
2004; Cogley and Sargent 2005). Concerning output, the literature is more divided
but, overall, the consensus is towards the “good luck” hypothesis. Diﬀerent views on
inﬂation and output are often supported by the observation that while the dynamic
properties of inﬂation have changed over time, those of GDP growth have not.
This paper revisits the results on the causes of the Great Moderation on output and
inﬂation volatility and shows that the typical macroeconomic models, looking only at a
handful of variables, overstate the role of good luck. Instead, changes in the economic
structure are given more and more prominence as we look at larger models.
Hence, we conclude that the ﬁnding that “good luck” explains the Great Moderation
is based on models which are excessively naive, either univariate or small dimensional,
which do not reﬂect accurately the information processed by both markets and central
bankers when producing their forecasts. Since the analysis is contaminated by omitted
variables problems, the estimation of the shocks is not consistent and this tends to
over-estimate their variance in the pre- Great Moderation sample. More generally, we
argue that, since models are typically miss-speciﬁed, shocks stand for features that
either are exogenous to the model we are considering or that we don’t understand. The
more detailed is the model, the more limited is the role of the shocks relative to the
internal propagation mechanism.
Our results suggest that it might be possible to construct a structural model in
which the Great Moderation is explained by a change in the structure and not by a
change in the residuals. However, given our results, such model must be larger than
the medium scale standard DSGE model with six or seven variables.
that, since the early eighties has stabilized inﬂationary expectations via commitment
Non-technical summary6
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1 Introduction
One of the most interesting facts of the last twenty years is that the volatility of output
growth and inﬂation in all OECD economies has declined, a phenomenon that has
been labeled as the Great Moderation. The literature has tried to establish whether
the volatility decline should be attributed to exogenous causes that is, the decline in
the volatility of shocks (the “good luck” hypothesis), or to a change in the propagation
mechanism of the shocks (change in the structure – “good policy” hypothesis).
Regarding inﬂation, studies with few exceptions have concluded that the decline in
volatility is due to credible monetary policy which has since the early eighties stabi-
lized inﬂationary expectations via commitment to a nominal anchor (see e.g. Stock and
Watson 2002, 2003; Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 2004; Cogley and Sargent 2005). Re-
garding output, on the other hand, the consensus supports the “good luck” hypothesis
(a summary review of the empirical ﬁndings is provided in Section 2).
One explanation of why diﬀerent conclusions have been reached for output and
inﬂation is that the evolution of the dynamic properties of these two variables diﬀers.
For inﬂation, the evidence points to an increase in persistence and therefore to a change
not only in variance but also in the autocorrelation structure (see e.g. Stock and Watson
2007). For gross domestic product (GDP), it has been shown that the the spectral
density of output growth before and during the Great Moderation period diﬀers only
by a proportional factor (Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 2004) and that the coeﬃcient of the
univariate autoregressive model for GDP growth is time invariant (Stock and Watson
2002). Both pieces of evidence suggest no change in the autocorrelation function of the
process. However, there is another stylized fact concerning output and inﬂation that
suggests that the “good luck” explanation for GDP might not be the right one. In the
Great Moderation sample, the ability to predict output and inﬂation beyond what can
be predicted on the basis of a simple random walk model (relative predictability) has
decreased. The evidence on inﬂation is well known: Atkenson and Ohanian (2001) and,
more recently, Stock and Watson (2007) have shown that the ratio between the mean
squared error of any (simple or complex) forecast and the variance of the process has
increased in the last twenty years. Recent evidence (D’Agostino, Giannone and Surico
2006; De Mol, Giannone and Reichlin 2006) points to the same phenomenon for GDP.
Ever since the mid-eighties and in contrast with the seventies both the professional
forecasters and the Federal Reserve Board (Greenbook forecasts) have been unable to
outperform the forecast obtained by a naive model in which tomorrow is predicted to
be the same as today.
How can we reconcile the good luck view with the evidence of invariant dynamic
properties of GDP and diminished relative predictability? This paper makes the point
that, if the autocorrelation function of the univariate process has not changed, then di-
minished relative predictability can be explained only by the cross-covariances between
GDP and other variables used by the Greenbooks and the professional forecasters in
computing their forecast. Relative predictability depends on the model and, therefore,
on the information we condition our forecast on. But if multivariate information mat-
ters, then any estimate of the role of the shocks for explaining the Great Moderation
must take it into account. If not, we incur an omitted variable problem with the con-7
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sequence of not obtaining a consistent estimate of the structural shocks. It is therefore
important to evaluate whether conclusions about good luck versus good policy – change
in structure are altered when we use information sets of diﬀerent size. In this paper
we pursue this evaluation through vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. We consider
VARs of diﬀerent size from a minimum of four to a maximum of nineteen variables,
both nominal and real. To overcome problems of overﬁtting in the larger models, we
will use Bayesian shrinkage as suggested in Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2007).
2 Some facts for the United States
Let us consider quarterly data for GDP and GDP deﬂator in the samples 1959–1983
(pre–Great Moderation) and 1984–2007 (Great Moderation).1 In the United States,
the standard deviation of yearly real GDP growth declined from 2.7 in the ﬁrst sample
to 1.28 in the second, the standard deviation of yearly GDP deﬂator inﬂation declined
from 2.7 to 0.75. The mean remained roughly unchanged for GDP growth while nearly
halving for inﬂation.2 Similar numbers are obtained for other OECD countries, but
here we focus on the United States.
Can these facts be attributed to exogenous causes (the shocks) or rather to changes
in the propagation mechanism? Table 1 summarizes results obtained by the empirical
literature using a variety of statistical techniques.
Table 1 Shocks or propagation? Summary of the ﬁndings on GDP
Authors Results
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) Propagation: Inventories
Kahn, McConnel and Perez-Quiros(2002) Propagation: Inventories
Stock and Watson (2002) Shocks 90%
Stock and Watson (2003) Shocks 80-120%
Primiceri (2005) Shocks
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) Shocks 50-75%
Dynan, Elmedorf and Sichel (2006) Propagation: Financial innovation
Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) Shocks: Investment wedge
Sims and Zha (2006) Shocks
Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian (2007) Shocks: Total Factor Productivity
Canova, Gambetti and Pappa (2006) Propagation and shocks
Castelnuovo (2007) Shocks
Gali and Gambetti (2007) Propagation and shocks
Mojon (2007) Shocks: Monetary policy shocks
Smets and Wouters (2007) Shocks
Clearly, the majority view is that the explanation on the decline in GDP growth
volatility is in the decline in shock volatility.3
1More precisely, our pre–Great Moderation sample ranges from the ﬁrst quarter of 1959 to the fourth
quarter of 1983 and the Great Moderation sample from the ﬁrst quarter of 1984 to the ﬁrst quarter of
2007.
2The average annual growth rates were 3.33 and 3.03 for GDP in the two periods while GDP deﬂator
inﬂation declined from 4.77 to 2.48.
3In presence of model miss-speciﬁcation, changes in structure might show up as changes in the
size of exogenous shocks. Structural explanations for the Great Moderation, however, might still be
uncovered by looking at the nature of the shocks in the spirit of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007).
For example, Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) ﬁnd that the Great Moderation is entirely explained by
investment-speciﬁc shocks, but they can not exclude the possibility that this ﬁnding reﬂects changes
in unmodeled ﬁnancial frictions.8
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Let us now turn to predictability. In Table 2 we report ﬁndings in D’Agostino,
Giannone and Surico (2006) on the relative performance of institutional forecasters:
the Federal Reserve (Greenbooks) and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
The upper panel in Table 2 refers to inﬂation and the lower panel to GDP. Each of
the two panels are divided in two sections: on the left we report pre–Great Moderation
results and on the right we report results of the Great Moderation.4 In each section, we
report statistics on the forecast based on the random walk model5 (Naive), Greenbook
forecasts (GB), and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for the four forecasting
horizons (h) from one to four quarters ahead. In particular, the “Naive” column reports
the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) of the random walk forecasts, while the GB
and SPF columns report, respectively, the ratio of the MSFE of the Greenbook and
Survey of Professional Forecasters to the corresponding MSFE of the random walk.
Table 2 Greenbook (GB) and Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF):
Relative Mean Squared Forecast Errors
Inﬂation
Pre-85 Post-85
h Naive GB SPF h Naive GB SPF
1 0.54 0.30∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1 0.08 0.58∗∗ 0.82
2 1.72 0.21∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 2 0.17 0.93 1.15
3 3.51 0.21∗∗ 0.25∗ 3 0.28 0.97 1.39
4 5.69 0.23∗ 0.32∗ 4 0.39 1.18 1.82
GDP
Pre-85 Post-85
h Naive GB SPF h Naive GB SPF
1 25.82 0.37∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 1 3.77 0.73 0.77
2 19.01 0.44∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 2 2.51 0.77 0.70
3 15.39 0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 3 2.15 0.85 0.73
4 13.18 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 4 2.03 0.89 0.74
Note: Asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy between each model and the random
walk at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) signiﬁcance levels.
Table 2 shows that inﬂation and GDP forecasts achieved MSFEs signiﬁcantly lower
than the naive forecasts in the pre-1985 period. However, this picture changed dramat-
ically after 1985, when the MSFE of the Greenbooks and the Survey of Professional
Forecasters no longer diﬀer statistically from those of a naive forecast. From these
results, one can conclude that relative predictability has strongly declined in the Great
Moderation sample.
3 Shocks or Propagation? The role of information
Let us denote real GDP growth as Δyt and assume that it can be represented by
Δyt = μ +Ψ ( L)ut,
where μ is the unconditional mean and ut an i.i.d. scalar shock with variance σ2
u.D e n o t e
the variance of Δyt by σ2
y.
4Notice that D’Agostino, Giannone and Surico (2006) splits the sample in 1985.
5In each period the random walk for the price variable predicts that the annual growth rate of
inﬂation h periods ahead is the same as the last observed in sample, while the random walk for GDP
predicts that the annual GDP growth rate h periods ahead will be equal to the average GDP growth
observed up to the period in which the forecast is made.9
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We are interested in understanding changes in the ratio ¾2
u=¾2
y. The variance of the
structural shock ut is estimated as the forecast error of an econometric model; therefore,
the empirical ratio is related to the measure of relative predictability deﬁned as6





If GDP is driven by one shock only and if the forecast error is a good estimate of
the structural shock ut, then declining predictability should indicate an increase in the
ratio between the variance of shocks and the variance of the process. This increase
would contradict most of the empirical evidence supporting the good luck hypothesis.
Therefore, if that evidence is accurate, then one or more of the following facts are
also true: (i) the institutional forecasters provide a poor forecast; (ii) there are two or
more shocks driving GDP and their relative importance has changed, with shocks that
entail less predictable dynamics becoming more sizable; (iii) the models used in the
literature omit relevant information for estimating the structural shocks.
Possibility (i) is unlikely because institutional forecasters are quite accurate (see
e.g. Sims 2002). Possibility (ii) is also unlikely because, if the relative importance of
the shocks had changed, we would have observed a signiﬁcant change in the shape of
the spectral density. The evidence does not support such change (on this point see
Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 2004).
Possibility (iii) requires some discussion. We ﬁrst denote the spectral density of ∆yt
as Sy(µ) with µ 2 (¡¼; ¼). Let us now see what this implies for predictability on the
basis of a univariate model.
The variance of the forecast error associated with a univariate model can be derived








and a measure of relative predictability associated to that model can be obtained by
dividing ¾2
e by the variance of ∆yt, which is the integral of the spectral density:










If, as the evidence suggests, the spectral density has changed by only a proportional
factor, then clearly relative predictability based on the univariate model cannot have
changed. Since predictability by institutional forecasters has declined, this suggests
that the univariate model is misspeciﬁed.
Let us now consider the following example, which mimics the evidence on diminished
volatility of the series, diminished predictability, and no change in the autocorrelation
function:
6In Table 2 we reported, among other things, the ratios between the MSFE of the Greenbook and
Survey of Professional Forecasters GDP forecasts with respect to the MSFE of the random walk. Such
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Observe in this example that although the autocorrelation function has not changed,
the change in volatility in the second period is explained by a change in propagation
while the variance of the shocks has remained the same. Predictability deﬁned in terms
of the structural shock declines in the post-1984 sample.







t+j ]. If the econometrician wrongly assumes that the shock
is an innovation with respect to GDP growth and estimates it through a simple uni-
variate model, then he will end up estimating:
Δy
pre84








t . The estimated shock e
pre84





t ) = 4Var(u
pre84
t )), and this will lead the econometri-
cian to over-estimate the importance of the shocks relative to the propagation in the
pre-1984 sample and to conclude that predictability has not changed.
The important point here is that a regression of GDP on its past leads to an omitted
variables problem. Because the shock ut is non-fundamental with respect to Δyt,i t
can be recovered only by using either future observations on Δyt or other variables. As
discussed by Forni et al. (2007), the shock can be recovered as the forecast error of a
larger model, including those variables that may help forecasting GDP growth.
This point remains true for more general cases of models with more than one shock.
An interesting illustration was when the monetary authorities shifted from a passive
interest rate policy (pre-1979 period) to implementing an active one (see, e.g. Clarida,
Gali and Gertler 2000). In mainstream neo-Keynesian models, a passive policy is shown
to be destabilizing, which implies an indeterminate equilibrium. In this case, as pointed
out by Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) and Canova and Gambetti (2007), the standard
log-linearized three-variables neo-Keynesian model for the output gap, inﬂation, and
the nominal rate cannot be approximated by a VAR on those three variables. In the
indeterminate regime, expectations variables must be included in order to estimate the
shocks consistently. This is another example of an omitted variables problem. In this
case, the estimated shocks are a mix of structural shocks, forecast errors, and their
lags and this mix has a larger variance than that of the structural shocks. Moreover,
the model will not perform well in predicting. The implication is that it would be
misleading to explain the Great Moderation via any counterfactual exercise based on a
three-variables VAR. Again, this is an example where the shocks are non fundamental
for a three-variables system.
The lesson of this discussion is very simple. In a time-series model, the split between
shocks and propagation depends on the conditioning information set. Shocks estimated
on the basis of small models may not be good estimates of structural shocks. This
suggests that the explanation of results that attribute the Great Moderation to the11
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good luck hypothesis is that the models used to estimate the shocks did not include
enough information and were therefore misspeciﬁed. Therefore, when evaluating the
role of shocks in the Great Moderation, we should study models of diﬀerent size.
How do we know whether the size of the forecasting model is appropriate? Loosely
speaking, we should consider the model size appropriate when it is suﬃcient to make
forecasts that is, increasing the number of variables included in the model no longer
improves the forecasting performance. Having established the size, we can then identify
structural shocks as linear combinations of the innovations obtained from the estimated
VAR. On this point, see Giannone and Reichlin (2006).
4 Large models: The great moderation revisited
In this section we perform counterfactual exercises to assess the role of shocks versus
propagation in explaining the declined volatility. This approach has been extensively
used in the literature (Stock and Watson 2002, 2003; Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 2004;
Primiceri 2005; Justiniano and Primiceri 2006; Smets and Wouters 2007). Our exercise
is based on four model speciﬁcations: a small VAR with GDP, GDP deﬂator, federal
funds rate, and commodity prices (as in Stock and Watson 2003); two larger systems
of six and seven variables, used, respectively, by Sims and Zha (2006) in their VAR
speciﬁcation and by Smets and Wouters (2007) for estimating a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the U.S. economy; and, ﬁnally, a VAR with
nineteen variables, including all the variables typically used in macro models. We do
not consider larger VARs as done in Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2007), since the
empirical results of that paper suggest that a VAR with about twenty macroeconomic
variables, which closely correspond to those used in this paper, is enough to capture the
structural shocks since adding extra variables does not signiﬁcantly change the results.
Table 3 lists the variables considered in the four models.
Table 3. VAR speciﬁcations
Large VAR Small VAR Sims - Zha Smets - Wouters
GDP x x x
GDP deﬂator x x x







Interest rate 1 year
Interest rate 5 years








Data are quarterly, ranging from the ﬁrst quarter of 1959 to the ﬁrst quarter of
2007.7 The small model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). For larger models
7The models are estimated with data in log-levels except for interest rates, capacity utilization,
unemployment rates, and changes in inventories, for which we do not take logarithms.12
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we face an issue of overﬁtting, which we address by using Bayesian shrinkage (see
Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin 2007; De Mol, Giannone and Reichlin 2006). In
practice we use a Litterman (random walk) prior whose tightness is set so that the
in-sample ﬁt of the interest rate equation in the large VAR models is ﬁxed at the level
achieved by the simple four-variables monetary VAR. This choice is grounded on the
evidence that U.S. short-term interest rates are well described by linear functions of
inﬂation and real activity (Taylor rules).
The VARs are estimated separately in the two subsamples:
ΔXt = Apre84(L)ΔXt−1 + epre84,t epre84,t ∼ WN(0,Σpre84),
ΔXt = Apost84(L)ΔXt−1 + epost84,t epost84,t ∼ WN(0,Σpost84).
First counterfactual exercise: How much of the Great Moderation can be explained
by a change in the propagation?
In this exercise we simulate shocks assuming that their covariance matrix has re-
mained unchanged at the level of the pre-84 sample estimates (ˆ Σpre84) and feed them
through the propagation mechanism estimated for the post-1984 sample ( ˆ Apost84(L)).
Precisely, we consider the following counterfactual processes:
ΔX∗
t = ˆ Apost84(L)ΔX∗
t−1 + e∗
pre84,t,e ∗
pre84,t ∼ WN(0, ˆ Σpre84).
If the counterfactual GDP standard deviation is the same as the actual standard
deviation observed in the post-1984 sample, then this should indicate that the change
of propagation mechanisms fully explains the Great Moderation. The change in shocks
plays a role if, instead, the counterfactual decline in volatility is smaller than observed.
Second counterfactual exercise: How much of the Great Moderation can be explained
by a change in the shocks?
In this exercise we assume that the propagation mechanisms has remained un-
changed at the level of the pre-1984 estimates ( ˆ Apre84(L)) and feed them with shocks
simulated using the covariance matrix estimated in the post-1984 sample (ˆ Σpost84).
That is:
ΔX∗∗
t = ˆ Apre84(L)ΔX∗∗
t−1 + e∗∗
post84,t,e ∗∗
post84,t ∼ WN(0, ˆ Σpost84).
If the counterfactual GDP standard deviation is the same as the actual standard
deviation observed in the post-1984 sample, then this should indicate that a change in
shocks fully explains the Great Moderation. The change in propagation mechanisms
plays a role if, instead, the counterfactual decline in volatility is smaller than observed.
Since the two exercises might not provide symmetric answers to the question of what
caused the Great Moderation, we report results in separate tables. Table 4a refers to
the ﬁrst and Table 4b to the second counterfactual exercise.13
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Table 4a First counterfactual exercise: Changes in propagation only
Coeﬃcients Shocks Std. Deviation
GDP growth Inﬂation
Observed
Pre 84 Pre 84 2.68 2.66
Post 84 Post 84 1.28 0.75
Small
Post 84 Pre 84 2.33 1.34
Sims and Zha
Post 84 Pre 84 1.75 0.92
Smets and Wouters
Post 84 Pre 84 1.90 0.93
Large
Post 84 Pre 84 1.30 0.69
Table 4a shows that, in the small model, the change in propagation explains none
of the decline in the standard deviation of GDP and half of the decline in the standard
deviation of inﬂation (good luck for GDP and both good luck and good policy for
inﬂation), while in the large model the change in propagation explains all the decline
in standard deviation both for GDP and inﬂation (good policy in both cases).
Table 4b Second counterfactual exercise: Changes in shock only
Coeﬃcients Shocks Std. Deviation
GDP growth Inﬂation
Observed
Pre 84 Pre 84 2.68 2.66
Post 84 Post 84 1.28 0.75
Small
Pre 84 Post 84 1.21 2.23
Sims and Zha
Pre 84 Post 84 1.42 2.28
Smets and Wouters
Pre 84 Post 84 1.54 2.41
Large
Pre 84 Post 84 1.90 2.42
As for the second counterfactual exercise, in the small model the change in shocks
volatility explains all the decline in GDP standard deviation and a ﬁfth of the decline in
inﬂation (good luck for GDP and mostly good policy for inﬂation). In the large model,
the decline in shocks volatility explains about a half of the decline in GDP standard
deviation but almost none of the decline in inﬂation volatility (good policy for inﬂation
and both good luck and good policy for GDP).14
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Summing up, both exercises give qualitatively similar results. The degree to which
shocks or propagation explain the Great Moderation depends on the size of the model.
Smaller models tend to favor changes in exogenous shocks as an explanation for the
great moderation, understating the role of changes in the structure of the economy.
5 Summary, conclusions, and implications of the results
The paper has considered VAR models of diﬀerent size and estimated them over the
pre-Great Moderation and the Great Moderation samples to evaluate the role of shocks
in explaining the observed decline in output volatility. We have found that results based
on counterfactual exercises change with the dimension of the model. The large model
attributes the Great Moderation to a change in propagation rather than a change in
shocks volatility.
We make the point that the larger model is the one to be trusted bacause, when
variables that Granger-cause GDP are not included in the estimated model, the shock
we estimate does not correspond to the structural shock. In general, if the decline in
output growth volatility is attributed to a decline in the variance of the shocks then,
since the dynamic properties of output growth do not show any signiﬁcant change, this
should imply that predictability remained the same since the eighties. This implication
is counterfactual, as indicated by the evidence based on forecasts produced by the Fed
and professional forecasters.
We conclude that the ﬁnding that “good luck” explains the Great Moderation is
based on models that are excessively naive either univariate or small dimensional and
that do not accurately reﬂect the information processed both by markets and central
banks when producing their forecasts. Because such analysis is contaminated by omit-
ted variables problems, the estimation of the shocks is not consistent and this leads to
over-estimating their variance in the ﬁrst period.
Our analysis suggests that what the literature on the Great Moderation attributes
to “luck” might better be attributed to “ignorance”. We focus on the omitted vari-
ables problem, but the point is more general. Models are generally miss-speciﬁed. In
structural models, shocks represent features that either are exogenous to the model or
that we don’t understand. The more detailed is the model, the smaller are the shocks
and the more limited is their role relative to the internal propagation mechanism. Our
results suggest that it might be possible to construct a structural model in which the
Great Moderation is explained by a change in the structure and not by a change in
the residuals. However, our results indicate that such a model would have to be larger
than the medium-scale standard DSGE model with six or seven variables.
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